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RESOLVING AFRICA'S LONGEST CIVIL
WAR: UPDATES ON THE CASE
CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
On May 28, 2002, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
("DRC") instituted proceedings in the International Court of Jus-
tice ("ICJ"), the judicial arm of the United Nations ("U.N."),
against the Rwandese Republic for "massive, serious, and flagrant
violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law."1
The DRC alleged that Rwanda's actions were in flagrant breach of
the sovereignty and territorial integrity as guaranteed by the U.N. 2
The DRC's application accused Rwanda of "armed aggression"
from August 1998 to the present, in the form of "large-scale human
slaughter" in South Kivu, Katanga Province and the Eastern Prov-
ince, "rape and sexual assault of women," "assassinations and kid-
napping of political figures and human rights activists," "arrests,
arbitrary detentions, inhuman and degrading treatment," "system-
atic looting of public and private institutions, seizure of property
belonging to civilians," "human rights violations committed by the
invading Rwandan troops and their 'rebel' allies in the major towns
in the East" of the DRC, and "destruction of fauna and flora."3
The war in the Congo region is the widest interstate war in
modern African history.4 As a result of this conflict, the DRC has
become an environment in which numerous foreign players have
1 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), 2002 I.C.J. 126 (Sept. 18) (New Applica-
tion: 2002), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icrw/icrworder/icrwiorder20
020918.html; see also Press Release, The Democratic Republic of the Congo Re-
quests the Court to Indicate Provisional Measures as a Matter of Urgency (May 28,
2002), available at www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2002/ipresscom2002-15-
crw_20020528.htm.
2 See Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo,
2002 I.C.J. 126.
3 Id.
4 Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: Rwandese-Con-
trolled East: Devastating Human Toll (June 19, 2001), available at http://
web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR62011200 [hereinafter Amnesty Update
I]; see also Detra Chandler, Current Development: Developments in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 7 NEW ENG. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 199, 206 (2001).
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become involved. 5 This only serves to complicate the situation and
to make peaceful resolutions of the conflict that much more com-
plex. The war has involved nine African nations and directly af-
fected the lives of 50 million Congolese. 6
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY LEADING UP TO THE
ICJ DISPUTE
The political and national life of independent Congo, formerly
known as Zaire, was biased from its inception. 7 In 1960, Belgium,
the colonial power, hastily handed the independence to the very
few highly educated Congelese residing in the country.8 The Bel-
gian authorities, backed by the United States Central Intelligence
Agency ("CIA"), succeeded in eliminating Patrice Lumumba, the
then Prime Minister of the DRC.9 They supported the rise to power
of Joseph Desire Mobutu who finally seized the state power by a
coup on November 24, 1967."° Mobutu embarked on a nationalistic
policy of "Zairinization"'1 in 1970 to create economic and political
autonomy for the newly created state of Zaire. In light of Mobutu's
5 See Amnesty Update I, supra note 3.
6 Id.
7 Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo: A Long-Standing
Crisis Spinning Out of Control (Sept. 3, 1998), available at http://web.amnesty.org/
library/Index/engAFR620331998 [hereinafter Amnesty Update II]. For an in-
sightful contemporary account of the brutal history of the Congo (former Zaire)
under the Belgian colonizers, see ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST:
A STORY OF GREED, TERROR AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1998).
8 HOCHSCHILD, supra note 7.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 75.
11 Economic nationalism was a common theme throughout post-indepen-
dence Africa, frequently manifesting itself in the expulsion of foreign merchants
and/or expropriation of foreign assets. For Zaire, economic autonomy and political
independence were seen as dependent on each other. Zairianization, the expropri-
ation plan announced in November 1973, represented both a combination of the
nationalistic impulse for economic independence and personal aggrandizement for
President Mobutu, who practiced a form of patrimonialism. Zairianization created
a vast pool of goods and money for personal distribution to loyal family members
and the political class composed mainly of government and army officials. It was
the final and clearest demonstration that political power was the primary means of
acquiring wealth. The entrepreneurial risk and initiative in building up business
enterprises required to develop an infrastructure for economic development were
thus not characteristic of the Zairian elite that came to dominate the country's
economy. See Country Study and Guide of Zaire (Data as of Dec. 1993), available
at http://www.lupinfo.com/country-guide-study/zaire/zairel 08.html.
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efforts, many small businesses owned by foreigners were national-
ized and given to new Zairian proprietors overnight.12 Within a
year, however, most of these new proprietors were bankrupted, tell-
ing signs of the difficulties the new country would face in years to
come.
In 1991, the economy was in such a poor state that Mobutu was
forced to accept a multiparty democracy. From 1991 to 1997, hun-
dreds of political parties were bickering and fighting in a never-end-
ing forum: the "Conference Nationale."'1 3 At the beginning of 1997,
Mobutu was dying from cancer and the political system he cun-
ningly imposed on Zairians was also falling apart. 14 However, a 30-
year opponent, Laurent Kabila, backed by Uganda's Museveni and
Rwanda's Kagame, launched a sweeping four month campaign
which forced Mobutu into exile. Laurent Kabila took over the gov-
ernment of the country on May 17, 1997, and Zaire was renamed
the Democratic Republic of Congo. In mid-1998, Kabila's relation-
ship with Museveni and Kagme severely deteriorated. These coun-
tries then became the sponsors of rebel groups that challenged
DRC's central government and were committed to removing
Kabila from power. Kabila was assassinated on January 17, 2001;
his son was elevated to lead the new nation shortly thereafter. 15
The latest phase of the armed conflict in the DRC began on
August 2, 1998.16 This conflict serves as a brutal reminder to the
international community that stability and prosperity cannot be
built on violations of human rights. Parties to this conflict forged a
coalition in late 1996, to dismantle refugee camps inhabited by
12 Amnesty Update II, supra note 7.
13 The Conference Nationale was held to address the concerns of the Con-
golese people in 1997 due to "flagrant violation of basic human rights," and "con-
tinuous ravaging of the nation's riches." As a result, the participants adopted a
five-point plan resolution to "initiate a process of democratization" within the re-
gion. For more information, see The International Conference on the Reconstruc-
tion of Congo-Zaire, Conference Declaration, Oct. 12, 1997, available at http://
www.congozaire.org/results.htm.
14 The only African state to escape colonization and the Scramble for Africa,
although it was briefly occupied by Italy from 1936-41, was Ethiopia. France, Great
Britain, and Italy recognized Ethiopian sovereignty between 1898 and 1907 and
made agreements to that effect. See IAN BROWNLIE, AFRICAN BOUNDARIES: A
LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 775 (1979).
15 For additional information on DRC's recent history, see Democratic Re-
public of Congo, Recent History, available at http://www.pcusa.org/pcusa/wmd/ep/
country/demrhis.htm (last visited May 15, 2003).
16 Amnesty Update II, supra note 7.
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members of the Hutu ethnic group, most of whom are from
Rwanda, and to overthrow former President Mobutu Sese Seko. 17
The coalition, which brought President Laurent Kabila to power in
1997, was known as the Alliance des forces democratiques pour la
liberation du Congo ("AFDL"). During a seven month war, tens of
thousands of unarmed refugees and Congolese citizens were mas-
sacred by members of the AFDL and other combatants, particu-
larly members of the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA). 18 These
victims were added to an estimated 1 million others who had been
massacred in the Great Lakes region of the DRC since 1990.19
Much of the international community chose to ignore the
atrocities committed by forces supporting President Kabila, which
included Rwandese government troops. In addition to having failed
to take measures in 1996 to protect unarmed civilians, the U.N. Se-
curity Council failed in July 1998 to respond adequately to a report
of the U.N. Secretary-General's Team ("SGIT") submitted to the
Security Council in June 1998.20 The SGIT was unable to complete
its investigations due to obstructions by the Congolese government,
and the U.N. Secretary-General withdrew the team in April 1998.
The SGIT report confirmed what other organizations and individu-
als had documented: that combatants loyal to President Kabila, in-
cluding Rwandese troops, had committed atrocities amounting to
violations of international humanitarian law, some of which could
amount to genocide. 21 The investigative team's recommendation
that further investigation be carried out by a competent, indepen-
dent and impartial body to identify those responsible, was ignored
by the Security Council. 22 Instead, the Security Council asked the
two governments of The DRC and Rwanda, which continue to deny
that their troops were directly responsible for human rights viola-
tions, to investigate the crimes and bring the perpetrators to jus-
17 Id.
18 The AFDL promises to bring democracy. See Rebecca Carr, McKinney
Asks U.S. for Action on Congolese War; Urging Diplomacy, ATLANTA J., Aug. 11,
1998, at 3A (criticizing Human Rights Abuses by President Lauren Kabila).
19 Amnesty International, 2003 UN Commission on Human Rights: A Time








tice.23 Presently, the same forces responsible for most of these
atrocities have now turned against each other and are likely to add
to the number and gravity of crimes requiring investigation and
redress.
24
The human rights situation in the DRC was already very grave
before war broke out in August 1998.25 Abuses included extra-judi-
cial executions by government forces, including by those now in op-
position to President Kabila, and deliberate and arbitrary killings
by armed groups, particularly in eastern DRC. Dozens of people
accused of flouting the ban imposed by the government on opposi-
tion political party activity have been imprisoned. 26 Others targeted
for detention include journalists and human rights activists. Many
of those arrested have been subjected to beatings, torture, and
other forms of ill-treatment at the time of their arrest and while in
custody. 27 Several dozen people were executed in 1998 alone after
being sentenced to death by a military court with no right to appeal
to a higher court. Most of the trials were unfair and most of those
executed were civilians.
28
Since August 1998, little information on the human rights situa-
tion in the DRC has come out of the country.2 9 The armed opposi-
tion has seized communication equipment and threatened human
rights activists and witnesses in areas under its control. 30 As in 1996
and 1997, this measure is being used to prevent information about
human rights abuses reaching the outside world.31 Witnesses in ar-
eas under government control fear being accused of supporting the
armed opposition if they denounce human rights violations by gov-
ernment forces.32
Amnesty International has received reports of hundreds of ar-
bitrary and unlawful arrests in Kinshasa, in particular of ethnic
23 See generally ALAN P. MERRIAM, CONGO BACKGROUND OF CONFLICr
253-67 (1961).
24 Amnesty Update II, supra note 7.
25 See MERRIAM, supra note 23, at 250.
26 Amnesty Update II, supra note 7.
27 Id.
28 Amnesty Update I, supra note 2.
29 Id.
30 Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo On the Precipice:
The Deepening Human Rights and Humanitarian Crisis in Ituri (Mar. 20, 2003),
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr620062003 hereinafter
Amnesty Update IV].
31 See MERRIAM, supra note 23, at 252.
32 Amnesty Update IV, supra note 30.
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Tutsi civilians, of people of Rwandan origin, of Congolese married
to Rwandan naturals, and of others perceived as sympathizers to
the rebellion. 33 The detainees have been taken away to unknown
destinations by members of the security forces and there are reports
that some may already have been killed. Some senior Congolese
officials and media have incited civilians to take up arms and attack
Tutsi. For example, on August 8, 1998, an official made a statement
on the Congolese radio from Bunia in Eastern Congo calling on
listeners to " . . . jump on the people with long noses, who are tall
and slim (reference to Tutsi) and want to dominate us... Wake up,
be aware of our destiny so as to defeat the enemy. ' '34 Similar broad-
casts in neighboring Rwanda incited killings of Tutsi, and led to the
massacre of as many as 1 million people in 1994.35 On August 25th,
President Kabila was reported to have called on people in the
Congo to take up arms, including traditional weapons such as bows
and arrows, to crush the enemy and prevent their becoming slaves
of the Tutsi.36
After the Tutsi-led alliance took power in the newly named
DRC in 1997, Rwandese Hutu and Congolese armed groups op-
posed to Tutsi and to the new Congolese government remained ac-
tive, particularly in Eastern DRC. Since 1997, insurgency in
Rwanda, which the Rwandese government claims is derived from
the DRC, has escalated. Thousands of unarmed civilians have been
killed both by the insurgents and by the Rwandese security forces.
In 1998, the conflict in Rwanda has shown no sign of abating and
massive human rights abuses by both parties continue to occur, es-
pecially in areas bordering the DRC.
II. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE DISPUTE
The DRC's application to the ICJ accused Rwanda of "armed
aggression" from August 1998 to the present, in the form of "large-
scale human slaughter" in South Kivu, Katanga Province and the
Eastern Province, "rape and sexual assault of women," "assassina-
tions and kidnapping of political figures and human rights activists,"
"arrests, arbitrary detentions, inhuman and degrading treatment,"
"systematic looting of public and private institutions, seizure of
33 Amnesty Update II, supra note 7.
3 Id.
35 Amnesty Update IV, supra note 30.
36 See Democratic Republic of Congo Recent History, supra note 15.
908 [Vol. XIX
AFRICAN CIVIL WAR
property belonging to civilians," "human rights violations commit-
ted by the invading Rwandan troops and their 'rebel' allies in the
major towns in the East" of the DRC, and "destruction of fauna
and flora" of the country.37 The public hearings of June 13 and 14,
2002, concerning the DRC's application for provisional measures
saw a complex debate on the issue of the ICJ's jurisdiction.
As the DRC attempted to found jurisdiction in its bid for the
indication of provisional measures, Rwanda responded that the lack
of jurisdiction was so manifest that the case should be struck from
the ICJ's List.38 The DRC primarily sought to found the ICJ's juris-
diction on compromissory clauses contained in various interna-
tional instruments and treaties to which both it and Rwanda were
parties. The DRC pointed out that in a number of international
conventions, should a dispute pertaining to the subject matter of
those treaties arise, provision is made for one or both parties to
refer the case to the ICJ, as long as the normal machinery provided
by the conventions for the settlement of disputes is exhausted. A
number of conventions were cited during the hearings, although it
was determined that some do not provide grounds for jurisdiction.
The DRC now seeks to found the ICJ's jurisdiction on the basis of
the following:
Article 22 of the Convention on Racial Discrimi-
nation. The article states: "Any dispute between two or
more State Parties with respect to the Interpretation or
Application of this Convention, which is not settled by
negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided
for in this Convention, shall, at the request of any of
the parties to the dispute, be referred to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice for decision, unless the dispu-
tants agree to another mode of settlement";
Article IX of the Genocide Convention. The arti-
cle reads: "Disputes between the Contracting Parties
relating to the interpretation, application, or fulfill-
ment of the present Convention, including those relat-
37 Sulmaan Khan, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the
CongoDemocratic Republic of the Congo vs. Rwanda, Security Council Simulation
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ing to the responsibility of a State for genocide or any
of the other acts enumerated in Article IIL shall be
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the
request of any of the parties to the dispute";
Article 66, paragraph (a) of the 1969 Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, whereby "any one of
the parties to a dispute concerning the application or
interpretation of article 53 or 64," regarding conflicts
between treaties and peremptory norms of interna-
tional law, "may, by a. written application, submit it to
the International Court of Justice for a decision unless
the parties by common consent agree to submit the dis-
pute to arbitration";
Article 29 of the Convention on Discrimination
against Women which reads: "Any dispute between
two or more State Parties concerning the interpreta-
tion or application of the present Convention shall, at
the request of one of them be submitted to arbitration.
If within six months from the date of the request for
arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the or-
ganization of the arbitration, any one of those parties
may refer the dispute to the International Court of Jus-
tice by request in conformity with the Statute of the
Court";
Article 75 of the WHO Constitution which reads:
"Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation
or application of this Constitution which is not settled
by negotiation or by the Health Assembly shall be re-
ferred to the International Court of Justice in conform-
ity with the Statute of the Court, unless the parties
concerned agree on another mode of settlement";
Article XIV, paragraph 2 of the Unesco Constitu-
tion, according to which: "Any question or dispute
concerning the interpretation of this Constitution shall
be referred for determination to the International
Court of Justice or to an arbitral tribunal, as the Gen-




Article 14, paragraph 1, of the Montreal Conven-
tion which reads "Any dispute between two or more
Contracting States concerning the interpretation or ap-
plication of this Convention which cannot be settled
through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of
them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months
from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties
are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitra-
tion, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to
the International Court of Justice by request in con-
formity with the Statute of the Court. '39
At the hearings, Rwanda argued that the ICJ was being asked
"to give what would amount to a final judgment on the merits (of
the case) under the guise of provisional measures," to "impose pro-
visional measures directed to States which are not parties to pro-
ceedings, and to international organizations which cannot be
party," and "to usurp the authority of other institutions by creating
its own international peacekeeping force." Such measures, Rwanda
argued, clearly fall outside the ICJ's jurisdiction. Indeed, the lack of
jurisdiction was so manifest, Rwanda continued, that it begged the
ICJ to remove the case from its List. The dispute clauses in the
treaties cited by the DRC can found jurisdiction only in disputes
"directly related" to the subject matter of those treaties; the case
bought before the ICJ was by no means directly linked to any of the
treaties that the DRC had cited.
40
The ICJ concluded that it follows from the preceding consider-
ations taken together that the ICJ did not have prima facie jurisdic-
tion necessary to indicate those provisional measures requested by
the DRC. However, the findings reached by the ICJ in the present
proceedings in no way prejudged the question of the jurisdiction of
the ICJ to deal with the merits of the case or any questions relating
to the admissibility of the Application, or relating to the merits
themselves; and they leave unaffected the right of the governments
of the DRC and Rwanda to submit their arguments in respect of
those questions. In absence of a manifest lack of jurisdiction, the
39 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), 2002 I.C.J. 126 (Sept. 18) (New Applica-
tion: 2002), athttp://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/icrw/icrworder/icrw-iorder_20
020918.html; see also Kahn, supra note 37.
40 See Kahn, supra note 37.
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ICJ finds that it cannot grant Rwanda's request that the case be
removed from the list. 41 The ICJ decided that it will accept briefs
from each party in 2003.42
The ICJ finally recalled that "there is a fundamental distinction
between the question of the acceptance by a state of the ICJ's juris-
diction and the compatibility of particular acts within international
law; the former requires consent; the latter question can only be
reached when the ICJ deals with the merits after having established
its jurisdiction and having heard full legal arguments by both
parties.
43
The ICJ stressed the necessity for the parties to these proceed-
ings to use their influence to prevent the repeated grave violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law which have
been observed most recently.
John R. Tatulli
41 See Press Release, Fixing of Time-Limits for the Filing of Pleadings Con-
cerning the Jurisidiction of the Court and the Admissibility of the Application
(Sept. 20, 2002), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2002/
ipresscom2002-22_crw_20020920.htm.
42 Id.
43 Id.
912 [Vol. XlX
